Separation-of-duty (SoD) is widely considered to be a fundamental principle in computer security. A static SoD (SSoD) policy states that in order to have all permissions necessary to complete a sensitive task, the cooperation of at least a certain number of users is required. Role-based access control (RBAC) is today's dominant access-control model. It is widely believed that one of RBAC's main strengths is that it enables the use of constraints to support policies, such as separation-ofduty. In the literature on RBAC, statically mutually exclusive roles (SMER) constraints are used to enforce SSoD policies. In this paper, we formulate and study fundamental computational problems related to the use of SMER constraints to enforce SSoD policies. We show that directly enforcing SSoD policies is intractable (coNP-complete), while checking whether an RBAC state satisfies a set of SMER constraints is efficient; however, verifying whether a given set of SMER constraints enforces an SSoD policy is also intractable (coNP-complete). We discuss the implications of these results. We show also how to generate SMER constraints that are as accurate as possible for enforcing an SSoD policy.
INTRODUCTION
Separation-of-duty (SoD) is widely considered to be a fundamental principle in computer security [Clark and Wilson 1987; Saltzer and Schroeder 1975] . In its simplest form, the principle states that if a sensitive task is comprised of two steps, then a different user should perform each step. More generally, when a sensitive task is comprised of n steps, an SoD policy requires the cooperation of at least k (for some k ≤ n) different users to complete the task. While the concept of SoD has long existed in the physical world, sometimes under the name "the two-man rule," in the computer security literature, its first mention seems to be by Saltzer and Schroeder [1975] under the name "separation-ofprivilege." In Clark and Wilson's [1987] highly influential work on commercial security policies for integrity protection, SoD was identified together with wellformed transformations as the two high-level mechanisms that are "at the heart of fraud and error control" and can be used to "enforce commercial security policies related to data integrity."
Consider the following example of buying and paying for goods, taken from the work by Clark and Wilson [1987] . The steps that comprise such a task are: (1) ordering the goods and recording the details of the order; (2) recording the arrival of the invoice and verifying that the details on the invoice match the details of the order; (3) verifying that the goods have been received and the features of the goods match the details on the invoice; and (4) authorizing payment to the supplier against the invoice. We would want to ensure that payment is not released on an order that was never placed and that the received goods match those in the order and those in the invoice. A policy that requires a different user to perform each step may be too restrictive. It may be permissible, for instance, that the user who places the order also records the arrival of the invoice. One may require that (a) the cooperation of at least three users is needed to perform all four steps, and (b) two different users perform steps (1) and (4) (i.e., no single user can order goods and authorize payment for them).
There are at least two approaches to enforce an SoD policy. In one approach, the system maintains a history of each task instance (e.g., a particular order in the above example). The history includes information on who performed each step. Before a user performs a step on the instance, the system checks to ensure that the SoD policy is not violated. This is referred to as dynamic SoD in the literature [Foley 1997; Nash and Poland 1990; Sandhu 1988] . (Foley [1997] refers to this as dynamic segregation-of-duties. Nash and Poland [1990] refer to this as object SoD and consider it as a kind of dynamic SoD.) In dynamic SoD, a user may be able to perform any step in a task instance; however, once the user has performed one step, the user cannot perform other steps in that instance.
Another approach to enforce SoD policies is to use static SoD (SSoD) policies. Each SSoD policy states that no k − 1 users together have all permissions to complete a sensitive task. Such an SSoD policy can be enforced by carefully assigning permissions to users, without maintaining a history for every task instance. It may seem that if an SSoD policy is satisfied, then the corresponding SoD policy is also satisfied. However, care must be taken to ensure this. are specific to RBAC. Each constraint limits the role memberships a single user is allowed to have. Whether a set of SMER constraints enforces a given SSoD policy depends upon how permissions are assigned to roles. For example, if all permissions that are needed to complete a sensitive task are assigned to a single role, SMER constraints cannot ensure that no single user possess all those permissions. Note that the distinction between mechanisms and objectives is a relative one. While SMER constraints are mechanisms to enforce SSoD policies, they may be implemented using other, lower-level mechanisms. At the same time, a SSoD policy, which specifies a lower-bound on the sizes of the sets of users that possess all permissions to complete a sensitive task, may be viewed as a mechanism to ensure that at least a certain number of users is involved for any instance of the sensitive task.
In the literature, this distinction between SSoD policy objectives and SMER constraints, as a mechanism to enforce them, is sometimes not clearly made. This is evident in the way these constraints are referred to in the literature. SMER constraints are often called static SoD constraints; DMER are called dynamic SoD constraints. For example, in the ANSI RBAC standard [ANSI 2004] , SMER constraints are called SSD constraints, and DMER constraints are called DSD constraints. As we discuss in Section 2.2, DMER constraints are not suitable for enforcing SoD policies. In fact, DMER constraints are motivated by the least-privilege principle rather than the separation-of-duty principle. A danger with equating SMER constraints with SoD policies is that the SMER constraints may be specified without a clear specification of what objectives they are intended to meet; consequently, it is unclear whether the higher-level objectives are met by the constraints or not. Another danger with equating SMER constraints with SoD policies is that even though when SMER constraints are specified there exist a clear understanding of what SoD policies are desired, when the assignment of permissions to roles changes, the SMER constraints may no longer be adequate for enforcing the desired SSoD policies.
When we make a clear distinction between objectives (SSoD policies) and mechanisms (SMER constraints), several interesting problems arise. For example, the verification problem is: "does a set of SMER constraints indeed enforce an SSoD policy?," and the generation problem is: "how do we generate a set of constraints that is adequate to enforce an SSoD policy?" Although the use of SMER constraints to support SoD has been studied for over a decade, and several authors (e.g., Kuhn [1997] and Sandhu et al. [1996] ) have recognized that SMER constraints are a mechanism to enforce SoD policies, surprisingly, these problems have not been examined in the literature, to the best of our knowledge.
Contributions and Organization
Our contributions in this paper are as follows.
r We provide precise definitions for SSoD policies and SMER constraints and precise formulations for the verification and generation problems. Through these definitions, we clearly illustrate the difference between SSoD policies as policy objectives and SMER constraints as mechanisms.
r We show that directly enforcing SSoD policies in RBAC is intractable (coNPcomplete), while enforcing SMER constraints is efficient; however, the verification problem is intractable (coNP-complete), even for a basic subcase of the problem. We also show that the verification reduces naturally to the satisfiability problem (SAT), for which there exist algorithms that have been proved to work well, in practice [Du et al. 1997] . We discuss the implications of these results.
r We define what it means for a set of SMER constraints to precisely enforce an SSoD policy, characterize the policies for which such constraints exist, and show how they are generated. For other kinds of SSoD policies, we present an approach that efficiently generates sets of SMER constraints that minimally enforce the policies.
The results reported here are fundamental to understanding the effectiveness of using constraints to enforce high-level SoD policies in RBAC. The verification and generation algorithms are also of practical significance in RBAC systems that use SMER constraints to enforce SSoD policies.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We discuss related work in the next section. In Section 3, we give definitions of SSoD policies and SMER constraints, as well as the computational complexities for enforcing them. In Section 4, we study the verification problem. In Sections 5 and 6, we study the generation problem. We conclude with Section 7.
RELATED WORK
The concept of SoD has long existed in the physical world, sometimes under the name "the two-man rule," for example, in the banking industry and the military. To our knowledge, in the information security literature the notion of SoD first appeared in Saltzer and Schroeder [1975] under the name "separation-ofprivilege." They credited Roger Needham with making the following observation in 1973: "a protection mechanism that requires two keys to unlock it is more robust and flexible than one that requires only a single key. No single accident, deception, or breach of trust is sufficient to compromise the protected information." Clark and Wilson's [1987] commercial security policy for integrity identified SoD, along with well-formed transactions, as two major mechanisms for controlling fraud and error. The use of well-formed transactions ensures that information within the computer system is internally consistent. SoD ensures that the objects in the physical world are consistent with the information about these objects in the computer system. As Clark and Wilson [1987] explained: "Because computers do not normally have direct sensors to monitor the real world, computers cannot directly verify external consistency. Rather, the correspondence is ensured indirectly by separating all operations into several subparts and requiring that each subpart be executed by a different person. " Sandhu [1988 " Sandhu [ , 1990 presented transaction control expressions, a historybased mechanism for dynamically enforcing SoD policies. Nash and Poland [1990] explained the difference between dynamic and static enforcement of SoD policies. In the former, a user may perform any step in a sensitive task provided • N. Li et al. that the user does not also perform another step on that data item. In the latter, users are constrained a priori from performing certain steps. [Foley 1997] proposed a framework based on relabel policies [Foley et al. 1996 ] to express dynamic SoD requirements. Sandhu and Jajodia [1990] studied what mechanisms are required in a general-purpose multiuser database-management system (DBMS) to facilitate the integrity objectives of information systems. They identified SoD as a "timed-honored principle for prevention of fraud and errors, going back to the very beginning of commerce" and explained SoD as "Simply stated, no single individual should be in a position to misappropriate assets on his own. Operationally, this means that a chain of events which affects the balance of assets must require different individuals to be involved at key points, so that without their collusion the overall chain cannot take effect."
SoD and RBAC
In one of the earliest papers on RBAC, Ferraiolo and Kuhn [1992] used the terms static and dynamic SoD to refer to static and dynamic enforcement of SoD. In a subsequent paper, Ferraiolo et al. [1995] defined static SoD as: "A user is authorized as a member of a role only if that role is not mutually exclusive with any of the other roles for which the user already possesses membership." This is the requirement of SMER constraints and not an SoD policy. Similarly, dynamic SoD was defined as forbidding a user from activating roles that are mutually exclusive. We call these DMER constraints. As we argue in Section 2.2, DMER constraints are motivated by the least privilege principle rather than the SoD principle. The NIST standard for RBAC [ANSI 2004; Ferraiolo et al. 2001 ] adopts the same terminology as Ferraiolo et al. [1995] .
This distinction between SoD policies as objectives and SMER constraints as a mechanisms has been recognized in the literature. Simon and Zurko [1997] stated "Separation of Duty is a security principle used to formulate multi-person control policies, requiring that two or more different people be responsible for the completion of a task or a set of related tasks." Sandhu et al. [1996] stated, in their widely cited paper that introduced the highly influential RBAC96 family of RBAC models, "The most common RBAC constraint is mutually exclusive roles. The same user can be assigned to at most one rule in a mutually exclusive set. This supports separation of duties, which is further ensured by a mutual exclusion constraint on permission assignment." This clearly shows that SMER constraints are not SoD policies themselves, but rather mechanisms that can be used to enforce SoD policies. Sandhu et al. [1996] pointed out that constraints on permission assignment can be used together with SMER constraints to better enforce SoD policies.
This distinction is made even clearer by Kuhn [1997] , whose work has the title "Mutual exclusion of roles as a means of implementing separation of duty in role-based access control systems." Kuhn's work [1997] is perhaps the closest in spirit to this paper. Kuhn discussed mutual exclusion of roles for separationof-duty and proposed a safety condition: that no one user should possess the privilege to execute every step of a task, thereby being able to complete the task. Our definition for safety in Section 3.1 is a generalization of Kuhn's [1997] definition: setting k to 2 gives us Kuhn's definition. Kuhn [1997] studied the kinds of constraint mechanisms on permission assignment that are needed, in addition to SMER constraints to achieve SoD. One such mechanism is complete exclusion in permission assignment, which requires that, if two roles r 1 and r 2 are declared to be mutually exclusive by a SMER constraint, then a privilege that is assigned to one of r 1 and r 2 cannot be assigned to any other role in the RBAC system. Kuhn [1997] showed that SMER constraints, together with complete exclusion, are sufficient to enforce the special case of SSoD policies he considered. This conclusion is only about the power of the particular constraint mechanism; it says nothing about whether a particular constraint configuration enforces a set of SSoD policies or how such constraints may be generated. In this paper, in addition to the problem of whether SMER constraints are sufficient to enforce SSoD policies, we consider such verification and constraint generation problems that are not studied by Kuhn [1997] .
There also exists a wealth of literature Sandhu 1999, 2000; Crampton 2003; Gligor et al. 1998; Jaeger 1999; Jaeger and Tidswell 2001; Joshi et al. 2003; Simon and Zurko 1997; Tidswell and Jaeger 2000] on constraints other than SMER and DMER constraints in the context of RBAC. They either proposed and classified new kinds of constraints [Gligor et al. 1998; Simon and Zurko 1997] or proposed new languages for specifying sophisticated constraints Sandhu 1999, 2000; Ahn and Sandhu 2000; Crampton 2003; Jaeger and Tidswell 2001; Tidswell and Jaeger 2000] . Most of the proposed constraints are variants of SMER and DMER constraints, for example, one may declare two permissions to be mutually exclusive, so that no role or user can be authorized for both permissions, or that two users are mutually exclusive, so that they cannot be assigned to the same role. Joshi et al. [2003] introduced a framework for specifying time-based cardinality constraints, control-flow dependency constraints, and SoD constraints in the, generalized temporal role-based access control (GTRBAC) model [Joshi et al. 2005] . The study of verification and generation problems related to those more sophisticated constraints is beyond the scope of this paper.
There has also been recent interest in static and dynamic constraints to enforce SoD in workflow systems. Atluri and Huang [1996] proposed an accesscontrol model for workflow environment, which supports temporal constraints. Bertino et al. [1999] proposed a language for specifying static and dynamic constraints for SoD in role-based workflow systems. They also discussed an algorithm for the problem of consistency checking in workflows; that is, to check whether a workflow with such constraints has a valid user-to-task assignment. Botha and Eloff [2001] introduced the "coAP administration paradigm" to express SoD constraints in workflow environments and asserted that it is the first work that allows for the specification of constraints among users, permissions, roles, and tasks. They also presented a prototype implementation. [Crampton 2004 [Crampton , 2005 Tan et al. 2004 ] considered the consistency-checking problem in workflows. Apart from constraints to enforce SoD, they also considered other goals, such as binding-of-duty. A binding-of-duty constraint mandates that if a particular user is assigned to perform a certain task, then he must also be assigned to perform a certain other task in a workflow instance.
• N. Li et al. Knorr and Stormer [2001] proposed SSoDL (simple SoD language) to specify constraints. A constraint in SSoDL takes the form (s 1 , t 1 ) → (s 2 , t 2 ), which means that if a subject s 1 has performed task t 1 , then s 2 must not perform task t 2 . Such constraints can be used to dynamically enforce SoD policies. Kandala and Sandhu [2002] proposed to use transaction control expressions [Sandhu 1988 ] to dynamically enforce SoD policies. We point out that none of the work on constraints in workflow systems has considered the verification and generation problems for constraints that we consider in this paper. The problems considered there are how to enforce the constraints proposed there and whether the constraints are consistent with each other; it is generally assumed in such work that constraints are already specified to meet some implicit objective.
DMER Constraints
DMER constraints are introduced in Ferraiolo et al. [1995] under the name DSoD constraints. A DMER constraint prevents a user from simultaneously activating mutually exclusive roles in a session. DMER constraints are called DSoD constraints because they are the "dynamic" version of SMER constraints, which are referred to as SSoD constraints in Ferraiolo et al. [1995] . However, DMER constraints do not seem to enforce SoD policies at all, because even though they limit the roles a user can activate in a single session, they do not prevent a single user from activating mutually exclusive roles across multiple sessions and finishing a sensitive task on his own. In RBAC, each session has only one user. Thus, a sensitive task that requires multiple users to complete cannot be completed in one session; several sessions are required. For example, suppose that two roles r 1 and r 2 are declared to be dynamically mutually exclusive in a DMER constraint; presumably, because in order to complete a sensitive task, one has to combine permissions assigned to r 1 with permissions assigned to r 2 . As each session can have only one user, this task cannot be finished in any single session and multiple sessions are needed to complete the task. A user can thus start a session, activate r 1 , use the permissions of r 1 to work on the task, end the session, start another session, activate r 2 , and use the permissions of r 2 to finish the task. This does not violate the DMER constraint, but clearly violates the intended SoD policy.
In fact, DMER constraints are motivated by the least-privilege principle rather than the SoD principle. The least-privilege principle mandates that "every program and every user of the system should operate using the least set of privileges necessary to complete the job" [Saltzer and Schroeder 1975] . By requiring certain roles to not be activated at the same time, one can limit the privileges that a user may use in a session. This aspect is also identified in the ANSI/NIST standard in RBAC: "DSD properties provide extended support for the principle of least privilege in that each user has different levels of permission at different times, depending on the task being performed." SMER constraints and DMER constraints are the only types of constraints that are included in the ANSI/NIST standard for RBAC [ANSI 2004; Ferraiolo et al. 2001 ], because they are considered to be the most fundamental and widely supported kinds of constraints. As we discuss above, DMER constraints cannot enforce SoD; we focus on SMER constraints in the rest of this paper.
STATIC SEPARATION OF DUTY AND MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE ROLES
In this section, we give precise definitions for SSoD policies, RBAC, and SMER constraints. Table I lists the acronyms we use in this paper. Users and permissions are at the core of an access control system. The state of an access-control system specifies the set of permissions each user has. In this paper, we treat permissions as if they are opaque, i.e., we do not consider the internal structure of permissions. We also assume that permissions are not related to one another, e.g., the possession of one or more permissions does not imply the possession of another.
Static Separation of Duty (SSoD) Policies
We now formally define SSoD policies.
where each p i is a permission and n and k are integers, such that 1 < k ≤ n.
Intuitively, the policy ssod { p 1 , . . . , p n } k means that at least k users are required to perform a task that requires all these permissions. In other words, there should not exist a set of fewer than k users that together have all the permissions in { p 1 , . . . , p n }.
The permissions in a k-n SSoD policy are the permissions needed to carry out a sensitive task and the policy guarantees that at least k users are needed to successfully complete it. If one wants to specify an SSoD policy, one should first identify a sensitive task, then identify the permissions needed to complete the task, and finally determine the minimum number of collaborating users authorized to complete it.
• N. Li et al. We now introduce the notion of an RBAC state. We assume that there are three countably infinite sets: U (the set of all possible users), R (the set of all possible roles), and P (the set of all possible permissions).
Notation 2.
An RBAC state γ is a 3-tuple UA, PA, RH , in which the user assignment relation UA ⊂ U × R associates users with roles, the permission assignment relation PA ⊂ R × P associates roles with permissions, and the role hierarchy relation RH ⊂ R × R specifies a relation among roles.
The reflexive, transitive closure of RH (denoted by RH * ) is a partial order among roles in R. When (r 1 , r 2 ) ∈ RH * , we often write r 1 ≥ r 2 and say that r 1 is senior to r 2 , which means that every user who is a member of r 1 is also a member of r 2 and that every permission associated with r 2 is also associated with r 1 .
We use Roles[PA] to denote the set of roles that appear in PA and Roles[RH] to denote the set of roles that appear in RH.
An RBAC state γ = UA, PA, RH determines the set of roles of which a user is a member and the set of permissions for which a user is authorized. Formally, γ is associated with two functions, auth roles γ : U → 2 R and auth perms γ : U → 2 P , where 2 R is the powerset of R and 2 P is the powerset of P. The two functions are defined as follows:
As auth roles UA,PA,RH [u] is determined only by UA and RH, we sometimes write auth roles (UA, R H) [u] .
Definition 3. We say that an RBAC state γ is safe with respect to an SSoD policy e = ssod { p 1 , . . . , p n } , k , which we denote by safe e (γ ), if, and only if, in state γ no k − 1 users together have all the permissions in the policy. More precisely,
In the above definition and the remainder of this paper, stands for "is by definition.") An RBAC state γ is safe with respect to a set E of SSoD policies, which we denote by safe E (γ ), if, and only if, γ is safe with respect to every policy in the set.
Definition 4. SC-SSOD (the safety checking problem for SSoD policies) is defined to be the following problem: Given an RBAC state γ and a set E of SSoD policies, determine if safe E (γ ) is true.
Observe that if no k − 1 users together have all the permissions in a policy, then no set of fewer than k users together have all the permissions. Example 1. Consider the task of ordering and paying for goods discussed in Section 1. We have a permission corresponding to each step in the task; these permissions are p order , p invoice , p goods , and p payment . We have the following set of SSoD policies:
Consider the RBAC state γ 1 = UA 1 , PA 1 , RH 1 , where UA 1 = {(Alice, Warehouse), (Alice, Finance), (Bob, Accounting), (Bob, Quality), (Carl, Engineering)}, and PA 1 and RH 1 are given in Figure 1 . The state γ 1 is not safe with respect to e 1 , a 3-4 SSoD policy, as the two users Alice and Bob together possess all four permissions in e 1 .
Given a set E of SSoD policies, suppose an RBAC system starts at a state that is safe with respect to E. Each time one is about to make a change to the system that may affect safety, one checks whether the RBAC state that results from the proposed change is safe and makes the change only when the answer is affirmative. Such a change may be the addition of a new user-role assignment to UA, a new role-permission assignment to PA, or a new pair to RH. This approach to ensuring that an RBAC system is safe requires solving SC-SSOD, which turns out to be intractable. THEOREM 1. SC-SSOD is coNP-complete.
PROOF. Consider the complement of SC-SSOD, i.e., given an RBAC state γ and a set E of SSoD policies, determine if safe E (γ ) is false, which is denoted by SC-SSOD. It suffices to show that SC-SSOD is NP-complete.
We first show that SC-SSOD is in NP. If an RBAC state γ is not safe wrt. E, then there exists a k-n SSoD policy in E and k − 1 users such that in γ these k − 1 users together have the n permissions in the SSoD policy. If one correctly guesses the k-n SSoD policy and the k − 1 users that together have all the n permissions in the policy, verifying that the guess is correct can be done in polynomial time: compute the union of the k − 1 users' permissions and check whether it is a superset of the set of permissions in the SSoD policy.
We now show that SC-SSOD is NP-hard by reducing the set-covering problem to it. In the set-covering problem, the inputs are a finite set S, a family
. . , S } of subsets of S, and a budget B. The goal is to determine whether there exist B sets in F whose union is S. This problem is NPcomplete [Garey and Johnson 1979; Papadimitriou 1994 ].
The reduction is as follows. Given S, F , and B, construct an SSoD policy e as follows: Let each element in S map to a permission in the policy, let k be B + 1, and let n be the size of S. We have constructed a k-n SSoD policy ssod S, B + 1 . Construct an RBAC state γ as follows. For each corresponding permission in S, create a role to which the permission is assigned. For each different subset S i (1 ≤ i ≤ ) in F , create a user u i to which all roles in S i are assigned. The resulting RBAC state γ is not safe with respect to {e} if, and only if, B sets in F cover S.
In the reduction in the proof, each permission is assigned to one role and the role hierarchy relation is empty; thus the problem remains coNP-complete even when we restrict ourselves to the case of RBAC without a role hierarchy.
While SC-SSOD is, in general, intractable, efficient algorithms for SC-SSOD exist when all the SSoD policies in E have small k. For example, when checking whether γ is safe with respect to a 2-n SSoD policy, one only needs to compute the set of permissions of every user and check whether it is a superset of the permissions in the policy. This has a worst-case time complexity of O(N u (N r + N p )), where N u is the number of users in γ , N r the number of roles, and N p the number of permissions. More generally, the running time for a straightforward algorithm for solving SC-SSOD for a k-n SSoD policy grows polynomially in the number of users and roles and exponentially only in k.
Statically Mutually Exclusive Role (SMER) Constraints
In RBAC, constraints such as mutually exclusive roles are introduced to enforce SSoD policies. In the most basic form, two roles may be declared to be mutually exclusive in the sense that no user is allowed to be a member of both roles. We now present a generalized form of such constraints.
Notation 5. A t-m SMER (t-out-of-m statically mutually exclusive role) constraint is expressed as
where each r i is a role and m and t are integers, such that 1 < t ≤ m. Such a constraint is said to be canonical of cardinality t when t = m. Definition 6. We say that an RBAC state γ satisfies a t-m SMER constraint c = smer {r 1 , . . . , r m } , t if, and only if, no user is a member of t or more roles in {r 1 , . . . , r m }. More formally,
When γ does not satisfy a SMER constraint, we say that γ violates the SMER constraint. An RBAC state γ satisfies a set C of SMER constraints, which we denote by satisfies C (γ ), if, and only if, γ satisfies every constraint in the set.
Definition 7. SC-SMER (the satisfaction checking problem for SMER constraints) is defined to be the following problem: Given an RBAC state γ and a set C of SMER constraints, determine whether γ satisfies C.
We point out that our notion of auth roles γ (for an RBAC state, γ ) from Notation 2 incorporates the role hierarchy. That is, the user u is a member of the role r in state γ if, and only if, r ∈ auth roles γ [u] . This definition for SMER constraints is consistent with the definition for static separation of duty constraints from the ANSI standard for RBAC [ANSI 2004] .
Each SMER constraint restricts the role memberships of a single user, in contrast to a k-n SSoD policy, which restricts the permissions possessed by a set of k − 1 users. Therefore, there is an efficient algorithm to check whether an RBAC state γ satisfies a set C of SMER constraints.
THEOREM 2. SC-SMER is in P.
PROOF. One algorithm for solving SC-SMER is as follows. For each t-m SMER constraint in C and for each user in γ , one first computes the set of all roles the user is a member of, then counts how many roles in this set also appear in the set of roles in the SMER constraint, and finally compares this number with t. This algorithm has a time complexity of O(N u N r M ), where N u is the number of users in γ , N r the number of roles in γ , and M is the number of constraints.
Given an RBAC state γ that satisfies a set C of SMER constraints, in order to ensure that the state that results from adding a new user-role assignment to γ still satisfies C, one needs to only check the role memberships of that user, which can be done in time O(N r M ). This is more efficient than solving the SC-SSOD problem each time an assignment is added to ensure that the state that results is safe with respect to the SSoD policies.
THE ENFORCEMENT-VERIFICATION PROBLEM
The facts that SC-SSOD is intractable and that an efficient algorithm exists for SC-SMER appear to provide a justification for using SMER constraints to enforce SSoD policies. However, when using SMER constraints to enforce SSoD policies, one needs to determine whether a set of SMER constraints is adequate to enforce a set of SSoD policies. The answer to this question depends on what permissions each role has, which, in turn, is determined by the permission assignment PA and the role hierarchy RH. For instance, if all permissions in an SSoD policy are assigned to one role, then no set of SMER constraints enforces that policy.
Notation 8. An SSoD configuration is a 3-tuple E, PA, RH , where E is a set of SSoD policies, PA is a permission assignment relation, and RH is a role hierarchy.
Definition 9. We say that a set C of SMER constraints enforces the SSoD configuration E, PA, RH if, and only if, the following is true.
• N. Li et al. Definition 10. EV (the enforcement-verification problem) is defined to be the following problem: Given an SSoD configuration E, PA, RH and a set C of SMER constraints, determine whether C enforces E, PA, RH .
If C enforces an SSoD configuration E, PA, RH , then no matter how the user assignment relation UA changes, as long as it results in an RBAC state that satisfies C, the state is safe with respect to the SSoD policies in E.
Example 2. Continuing from Example 1, we consider the following set of SMER constraints
The constraint c 1 ensures that no user is a member of any two roles in Warehouse, Accounting, and Finance; thus, the smallest number of users that have memberships in all the three roles is three and, therefore, the smallest number of users that the permissions p goods , p invoice , and p payment is also three. This ensures safety with respect to the SSoD policy e 1 . The constraints c 2 and c 3 together ensure safety with respect to e 2 . Thus, C 1 enforces E 1 , PA 1 , RH 1 .
In Example 1, we observed that the state γ 1 is not safe with respect to E 1 ; therefore, it does not satisfy C 1 . In particular, γ 1 violates the constraint c 1 , because Alice is assigned to both Warehouse and Accounting.
We now establish an upper bound on the computational complexity of EV.
LEMMA 3. EV is in coNP
PROOF. Consider the complement problem of EV, denoted by EV, i.e., determine whether C does not enforce E, PA, RH . This problem is essentially one of determining whether there exists a user-role assignment, such that satisfies C ( UA, PA, RH ), is true, but safe E ( UA, PA, RH ) is false. It suffices to show that EV is in NP. To do this, we show that if C does not enforce E, PA, RH , then a short (polynomial in the input size) evidence exists that can be verified in polynomial time.
If a set C of t-m SMER constraints does not enforce E, PA, RH , then there exists a counter-example, i.e., a user-role assignment UA such that satisfies C ( UA, PA, RH ) is true, but safe E ( UA, PA, RH ) is false. That is, there exists a k-n SSoD policy in E that is violated by k −1 users. If such an UA exists, then a subset of the UA that consists of just the k − 1 users is also a counterexample. Thus, the smallest counter-example has size linear in the size of the input. Once the counter-example is guessed, its correctness can be verified in time polynomial in the size of the input. This shows that EV is in NP.
A Special Case of the EV Problem
In this section, we show that every set of SMER constraints can be equivalently represented using a set of canonical (t-t) SMER constraints. Therefore, we need to consider only such constraints. We then study the EV problem for canonical SMER constraints.
Definition 11. Let C 1 and C 2 be two sets of SMER constraints. We say that C 1 and C 2 are equivalent if, and only if, for every RBAC state γ , γ satisfies C 1 if, and only if, γ satisfies C 2 .
Clearly, if C 1 and C 2 are equivalent, then C 1 enforces E, PA, RH if, and only if, C 2 enforces E, PA, RH . 
PROOF. Given a t-m SMER constraint
That is, C is the set of all constraints smer R, t , such that R is a size-t subset of {r 1 , . . . , r m }. It is easy to see that the violation of any constraint in C implies the violation of the constraint c and the violation of the constraint c implies the violation of some constraint in C . Therefore, C and {c} are equivalent.
It follows from Lemma 4 that for every set C of SMER constraints, there exists a set C of canonical SMER constraints such that C and C are equivalent with respect to the allowed configurations. Furthermore, given an instance of EV in which the set E contains more than one SSoD policy, one can verify these policies one by one. Therefore, without loss of generality, we assume that E is a singleton set, i.e., E = {e} consists of one policy. This enables us to limit our attention to the following special case of EV.
Definition 12. CEV (the canonical enforcement-verification problem) is defined as follows: Given PA, RH, a singleton set {e} of SSoD policies and a set C of canonical SMER constraints, determine whether C enforces {e}, PA, RH .
An algorithm solving CEV can be used to solve EV, as any EV instance can be translated into a set of CEV instances. However, the resulting CEV instance may have an exponential blowup in size, as we would have m t canonical SMER constraints for each t-m SMER constraint. On the other hand, if an RBAC system uses only canonical constraints to start with, then such blowup does not occur.
Computational Complexities of CEV and EV
We now show that CEV is coNP-hard by showing that a special case of it is coNP-complete. The special case we consider is whether a set of 2-2 SMER constraints satisfies a 2-n SSoD policy. Recall that a 2-2 SMER constraint specifies that two roles are mutually exclusive, i.e., no user can be a member of both roles. This is the most common kind of constraints considered in the literature. A 2-n SSoD specifies that no single user is allowed to possess all of n given permissions. This is the simplest and most common type of SSoD policy. This special case is thus arguably the simplest verification problem.
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THEOREM 5. Determining whether a set of 2-2 SMER constraints enforces {e}, PA, RH , where e is a 2-n SSoD policy, is coNP-complete.
PROOF. That this problem is in coNP follows from Lemma 3. We prove that this problem is coNP-hard by reducing MONOTONE-3-2-SAT to the complement of this problem. We define MONOTONE-3-2-SAT as being a special case of monotone-CNF-SAT, where each clause is composed of either three positive literals or two negative literals. We show in Appendix 1 that MONOTONE-3-2-SAT is NP-complete.
Given a MONOTONE-3-2-SAT problem instance composed of positive clauses of the form (
is mapped to a permission p i assigned to the three roles r(v i 1 ), r(v i 2 ), and r(v i 3 ). Intuitively, the clause is true if, and only if, the user u has permission p i . (3) Each negative clause (¬v j 1 ∨ ¬v j 2 ) is mapped to a 2-2 SMER constraint smer {r(v j 1 ), r(v j 2 )}, 2 . This negative clause is true if, and only if, the user is not a member of both r(v j 1 ) and r(v j 2 ).
The MONOTONE-3-2-SAT instance is satisfiable if, and only if, the 2-n SSoD policy ssod { p 1 , p 2 , ..., p n }, 2) can be violated while satisfying all the 2-2 SMER constraints.
COROLLARY 6. EV and CEV are coNP-complete.
PROOF. Follows directly from Lemma 3 and Theorem 5.
Solving CEV Using SAT
Consider the complement of CEV, denoted by CEV: If C does not enforce an SSoD configuration {ssod { p 1 , · · · , p n }, k }, PA, RH , then there exists a userto-role assignment UA such that all the SMER constraints in C are satisfied by the state UA, PA, RH , but there are k − 1 users together possess all permissions { p 1 , . . . , p n }. In the rest of this section, we show that the CEV naturally reduces to SAT. In particular, we show that given a CEV instance that consists of C and {ssod { p 1 , · · · , p n }, k }, PA, RH , the reduction results in a SAT instance of size linear in the size of the input, when k = 2. When k > 2, the resulting SAT instance is of size O(k N ), where N denotes the size of the input instance.
An implication of the existence of such a reduction is that we can use algorithms for SAT to solve CEV. Given a CEV instance, the answer is YES if, and only if, the corresponding SAT instance is not satisfiable. SAT has been studied extensively for several decades (see, for example, Du et al. [1997] ). Many clever algorithms exist that can answer most instances efficiently. The fact that CEV naturally reduces to SAT means that one can benefit from the extensive research on SAT and to easily turn a practical SAT solver into a practical CEV solver.
An instance of the CEV problem is given by PA, RH, a set C of canonical constraints, and a k-n SSoD policy e. We need to map such an instance to a SAT instance such that the SAT instance is satisfiable if, and only if, C does not enforce {e}, PA, RH . In other words, if the SAT instance is satisfiable, then we can find a user-assignment relation UA such that the constraints in C are satisfied, but the state UA, PA, RH is not safe with respect to e.
We first give such a mapping for a subcase of CEV, where e is a 2-n SSoD policy, i.e., no single user has all n permissions in e. When constructing a SAT instance from such a CEV instance, our goal is to find a user-to-role assignment for one single user such that this user has all permissions in e without violating any constraint in C.
The SAT instance is constructed as follows. For each role r appearing in PA, RH, and C, create a propositional variable v r . Intuitively, if v r is true, then the user is a member of the role v r . Construct the set of clauses for the SAT instance as follows. r For each permission p in e, if r 1 , r 2 , . . . , r are all the roles that are associated with the permission p, then add the clause
This clause means that, to have the permission p, the user must be a member of one of the roles that are associated with the permission p. r For each constraint c = smer {r 1 , r 2 , . . . , r t }, t in C, add to the instance the following clause
This clause means that, to satisfy the constraint, there must be at least one role in {r 1 , r 2 , . . . , r t } of which the user is not a member. r For each role hierarchy relationship (r 1 , r 2 ) ∈ RH, add to the instance the following clause
This clause means that if a user is a member of r 1 , then it must also be a member of r 2 .
If the SAT instance is satisfiable, let I be a truth assignment that makes the instance true. Then, assign the user to be a member of every role r, such that v r is true in I . The user has all permissions in e without violating any constraint in C; therefore, C does not enforce {e}, PA, RH . On the other hand, if C does not enforce {e}, PA, RH , then there exists a UA such that in the RBAC state UA, PA, RH there exists a user who has all permissions in e and the role memberships of the user in this state give rise to a truth assignment that make the SAT instance true.
We now give the mapping for any instance of CEV. Given a k-n SSoD policy e where k > 2, we need to consider role memberships of k − 1 different users at the same time. Our goal is to find a user-assignment relation, such that k − 1 together have all permissions in e, yet none of the k − 1 user's role memberships violate constraints in C.
Given PA and RH, let C be a set of canonical constraints and e be a k-n SSoD policy. Construct a SAT instance as follows. For each role that appears in PA, RH and C, create k − 1 proposition variables. The propositional variables 
To have the permission p, at least one of the k − 1 users must be a member of one of these roles. r For each constraint c ∈ C, let c = smer {r 1 , r 2 , . . . , r t }, t ; for each i from 1 to k − 1, add the following clause
To satisfy the constraint, for every user, there must exist a role in {r 1 , r 2 , . . . , r t } of which the user is not a member. r For each role hierarchy relationship (r 1 , r 2 ) ∈ RH, and for each i from 1 to k − 1, add the following clause
The SAT instance is satisfiable if, and only if, C does not enforce {e}, PA, RH .
Comparing Approaches for Enforcing SSoD Policies
In Section 3.1, we discussed the following approach for enforcing SSoD policies. Each time one is about to make a change to the system that may affect safety, one checks whether the RBAC state that results from the proposed change is safe and makes the change only if the answer is affirmative. We call this approach direct enforcement; it requires solving SC-SSOD.
One can also use SMER constraints for enforcing SSoD policies; we call this indirect enforcement. This requires solving SC-SMER. This approach also requires one to ensure that existing SMER constraints enforce the desired SSoD policies. One way to achieve this is to solve EV. Another way to achieve this is to generate SMER constraints from SSoD policies with the guarantee that the generated constraints enforce the policies in any RBAC state. We discuss the generation of such constraints in Sections 5 and 6.
In summary, we have three approaches for enforcing SSoD policies:
1. direct enforcement by solving SC-SSOD; 2. indirect enforcement by solving SC-SMER and EV; and 3. indirect enforcement by solving SC-SMER and the constraint-generation problem.
We now compare these approaches.
Recall that SC-SSOD is intractable (coNP-complete), in general; however, it is efficiently solvable when the value k in a k-n SSoD policy is small. SC-SMER is efficiently solvable; however, EV is intractable ( coNP -complete). In fact, we have shown that verifying whether a set of 2-2 SMER constraints enforces {e}, PA, RH , where e is a 2-n SSoD policy, may be intractable. This result is quite surprising and casts doubts on the effectiveness of the approach of using SMER constraints to enforce SSoD policies, which has been adopted in the literature without being questioned for years. From the point of view of computational complexity, we can conclude the following. For SSoD policies with smaller values of k, approach (1) is more advantageous than approach (2). For more general SSoD policies, approach (3) is the most advantageous, if one can solve the constraint-generation problem practically.
Going beyond computational complexity in comparing approaches (1) and (2), we make the following two observations that favor approach (2).
First, when using SMER constraints to enforce SSoD policies, EV, which can be computationally expensive, needs to be performed only when either a new role-role relationship is added to the role hierarchy or a permission in an SSoD policy is assigned to some role. When a user is assigned to a role, only constraint checking (SC-SMER) needs to be performed, which is quite efficient. On the other hand, when enforcing SSoD policies directly, the expensive safety checking (SC-SSOD) needs to be performed every time a user is assigned to a role of which the user was not already a member. As user-to-role assignment is the most dynamic relation, enforcing SSoD policies directly may be overall more expensive than using SMER constraints.
Second, the complexity of SC-SSOD is calculated in the number of users plus the number of roles; the complexity of CEV is calculated in the number of roles only. (In both cases, one needs to consider only the permissions in the SSoD policies, rather than all permissions in the RBAC state.) As most RBAC systems have many more users than roles, solving EV is likely to be more efficient than solving SC-SSOD, in practice. For example, in a case study of the RBAC system of an European bank [Schaad et al. 2001] , it has been reported that there are about 40,000 users and 1300 roles, with a role/user ratio of approximately 3.2%. The study [Schaad et al. 2001 ] also cites an oral estimate that was given at the RBAC2000 workshop, that suggests that the number of roles in a role-based system is approximately 3-4% of the user population.
Given the above comparisons, we can see that both approaches (1) and (2) have relative disadvantages, and approach (3) would be the most promising approach provided we can solve the constraint generation problem efficiently. A more conclusive comparison of these approaches requires access to data in realworld systems and is beyond the scope of this paper. To decide which approach to use in a given situation, one would need to know the kinds of SSoD policies and constraints that one is likely to encounter. Results in this paper provide helpful information in making the decision.
CONSTRAINT GENERATION: FROM SSOD POLICIES TO RSSOD REQUIREMENTS
Section 4 considers the problem of verifying that SMER constraints in RBAC enforce the desired SSoD policies. In this and the next section, we study the
problem of generating a set of SMER constraints that are adequate for enforcing SSoD policies. The generation problem that we study is as follows: Given an SSoD configuration E, PA, RH , where E is a set of SSoD policies, PA is a permission-assignment relation, and RH is a role hierarchy, generate a set C of SMER constraints that enforces E, PA, RH . Such a set C ensures that for every possible user-assignment relation UA, as long as all constraints in C are satisfied, the RBAC state is guaranteed to be safe with respect to E. This way, when the UA relation is changed, one only needs to check whether constraints in C remain satisfied. In Section 5.1, we study the problem of determining whether an SSoD configuration is enforceable. In Section 5.2, we introduce the notion of role-level static separation-of-duty (RSSoD) requirements as an intermediate step from SSoD policies to SMER constraints. In Section 5.3, we study the computational complexity of several problems related to RSSoD requirements.
Enforceability of SSoD Configurations
Given an SSoD configuration E, PA, RH , there may not exist a set C of constraints that enforces E, PA, RH . PROOF. For the "only if " part, we show that if the condition in the lemma does not exist, then the SSoD configuration is enforceable. Consider the set C of constraints that includes a 2-2 SMER constraint for every pair of roles in PA and RH; this means that every pair of roles is mutually exclusive. This forbids any user from being assigned to any role that is senior to a role other than itself. For example, if r 1 ≥ r 2 , then to satisfy the constraint smer {r 1 , r 2 }, 2 , no user can be a member of r 1 . In any state that satisfies these constraints, only those roles that are not senior to any role other than itself can have any member. Furthermore, no user is a member of two roles. Therefore, k − 1 users together can be member of, at most, k − 1 roles. If the condition in the lemma does not exist, then no k − 1 users have all permissions in { p 1 , . . . , p n }. Therefore, C enforces the SSoD configuration.
For the "if " part, consider the following. If there exist an SSoD policy ssod { p 1 , . . . , p n }, k in E and k − 1 roles in PA, such that these k − 1 roles together have all the permissions in { p 1 , . . . , p n } and none of these k − 1 roles is senior to a role other than itself, then one can construct an RBAC state in which there are k − 1 users and each of the users is assigned one of the k − 1 role. Such a state is unsafe with respect to E. In such an RBAC state, each user is a member of only one role; thus, no SMER constraint is violated. Therefore, no matter which set of SMER constraints one specifies, the state will satisfy the constraints, while being unsafe.
We observe from the proof of the above lemma that given any enforceable configuration, 2-2 SMER constraints are sufficient to enforce it. THEOREM 8. Determining whether an SSoD configuration is enforceable is coNP-complete.
PROOF. We consider the complement of the problem, that is, to determine whether an SSoD configuration is not enforceable. We first show that this problem is in NP: From Lemma 7 given a solution set of k − 1 roles, we compute the set of permissions assigned to those roles and check whether it is a superset of the set of permissions in the SSoD policy.
We show that the problem is NP-hard by reducing the set-covering problem, which is NP-complete, to it. In the set-covering problem, the inputs are a finite set S, a family F = {S 1 , . . . , S } of subsets of S, and a budget B. The goal is to determine whether there exists B sets in F whose union is S. Given an instance of the set-covering problem: S, F , and B, construct an SSoD policy e as follows. Let each element in S map to a permission in the policy ssod S, B + 1 , let k be B + 1, and let n be the size of S. We have constructed a k-n SSoD policy. For each different subset S i (1 ≤ i ≤ ) in F , create a role r i and assign to it all permissions corresponding to the elements in S i . B sets in F cover S if, and only if, the SSoD configuration is not enforceable.
Similar to SC-SSOD, efficient algorithms exist when all the SSoD policies in the configuration have small k.
RSSoD Requirements
SSoD policies are expressed in terms of restrictions on permissions. On the other hand, SMER constraints are expressed in term of restrictions on role memberships. In order to generate SMER constraints for enforcing SSoD policies, the first step is to translate restrictions on permissions expressed in SSoD policies to restrictions on role memberships. We now define such role-level SSoD requirements.
Notation 14. A k-n RSSoD (k-out-of-n role-based static separation-of-duty) requirement has the form rssod {r 1 , . . . , r n } , k where each r i is a role and n and k are integers such that 1 < k ≤ n.
When a set of users together have memberships in every role in a set of roles, we say that these users cover the roles in the set.
Definition 15. We say that an RBAC state γ is safe with respect to the RSSoD requirement d = rssod {r 1 , . . . , r n } , k , denoted by safe d (γ ), if and only if there does not exist a set of fewer than k users that cover the n roles in d . More formally,
An RBAC state γ is safe with respect to a set D of RSSoD requirements, denoted by safe D (γ ), if, and only if, it is safe with respect to every requirement in D.
We now show that, given an SSoD configuration E, PA, RH , one can generate a set D of RSSoD requirements from E and PA, such that D captures the security restrictions inherent in the configuration.
Definition 16. Given PA and E, the standard set of RSSoD requirements derived from PA and E, denoted by D S (E, PA), is defined as follows:
where ∅ is the empty set and auth perms PA [R] = {p | (r, p) ∈ PA ∧ r ∈ R} gives the set of all permissions that are assigned to some role in R according to PA; r otherwise, D S (E, PA) includes rssod R, k for each ssod P, k ∈ E and each R ∈ 2 R , such that (auth perms
In other words, D S (E, PA) can be computed as follows: for each ssod P, k ∈ E and for each minimal set of roles that have all permissions in P according to PA, declare that no k − 1 users can cover all roles in the set. If any of the set of roles so computed has a size smaller than k, then set D S (E, PA) to ∅. We point out D S (E, PA) = ∅ if, and only if, either E, PA, RH is not enforceable (see Lemma 7), or UA, PA, RH is trivially safe (that is, some permission from P is not assigned to any role).
The following theorem shows that for any SSoD configuration E, PA, RH , the set D S (E, PA) captures the security requirement in the configuration.
THEOREM 9. Given E and PA, the set D S (E, PA) satisfies the following condition.
PROOF. Given any UA and RH, if γ = UA, PA, RH is not safe with respect to D S (E, PA), then there is an RSSoD requirement rssod R, k in D S (E, PA) and there exist k − 1 users in γ , such that these users together are authorized for all roles in R. Given the way in which D S (E, PA) is defined, there exists an SSoD policy in E such that the roles in R together have all permissions in it; therefore γ is not safe with respect to E.
If γ = UA, PA, RH is not safe with respect to E, then there exist e = ssod { p 1 , . . . , p n } , k and k − 1 users that together have all permissions in { p 1 , . . . , p n }. Let R 1 be the set of all roles that these users are members of in γ and let R 2 be the set of roles in PA, then the set of permissions that are authorized to R 1 ∩ R 2 includes { p 1 , . . . , p n }. By the definition of D S (E, PA), there exists an RSSoD requirement d = rssod R, k , such that R ⊆ R 1 ∩ R 2 ; γ is not safe with respect to d and, thus, not safe with respect to D S (E, PA).
Example 3. Consider the SSoD configuration given in Example 1, the following set of RSSoD requirements precisely captures the security requirements in the configuration.
Runtime Checking and Verification for RSSoD Requirements
Our main objective to introduce RSSoD requirements is to use them as an intermediate step from SSoD policies to SMER constraints. Several problems naturally arise; we now study their computational complexities.
Definition 17. The runtime RSSoD checking problem is as follows: Given an RBAC state γ and a set D of RSSoD requirements, determine whether safe D (γ ).
THEOREM 10. The runtime RSSoD checking problem is coNP-complete.
PROOF. The proof is essentially the same as that for Theorem 1: by reducing the set-covering problem to the complement of the runtime RSSoD checking problem. The universe S is mapped to the set of all roles in the RSSoD requirement and each subset S i (1 ≤ i ≤ ) in F is mapped to the set of roles assigned to a user.
Definition 18. The RSSoD verification problem is as follows: Given PA, RH, a set D of RSSoD requirements, and a set C of SMER constraints, determine whether C enforces D (under PA and RH) , that is, whether
The RSSoD verification problem can be viewed as a special case of the EV problem in which the role hierarchy is empty and the permission assignment is degenerated (i.e., each permission is assigned to a different role). Because the permission assignment is degenerated, the hardness of this problem does not follow from the coNP-completeness of the problem to determine whether a set of 2-2 SMER constraints enforces a 2-n SSoD policy; the proof there involves a reduction from MONOTONE-3-2-SAT that uses permission assignment in a nondegenerated way.
THEOREM 11. The problem of verifying whether a set of 2-2 SMER constraints enforces a 4-n RSSoD requirement is coNP-complete.
PROOF. We consider the complement of the problem: determine whether there exists a user-role assignment, such that the SMER constraints are satisfied and k − 1 users together are authorized for n roles in the RSSoD requirement. We need to show that the complement is NP-complete.
That the complement problem is in NP follows from the fact that the EV problem is in coNP (Lemma 3).
• N. Li et al. To show NP-hardness, we use a reduction from the GRAPH 3-COLOR-ABILITY problem [Garey and Johnson 1979] , which determines whether a graph G is 3-colorable. Given a graph with n vertices, we map each vertex in the graph to a role, and each edge in the graph to a 2-2 SMER constraint where the two roles are the ones corresponding to the two endpoints of the edge. Let r 1 , . . . , r n be all roles that result from this process and let C be the set of resultant constraints. A 4-n RSSoD requirement d is constructed as rssod {r 1 , . . . , r n } , 4 . We now show that C does not enforce {d } if, and only if, the graph is 3-colorable. Each user is viewed as a color and a node is assigned a color, which means that the user is a member of the role corresponding to the node. The graph is 3-colorable if, and only if, there are three users who can cover all n roles without violating any of the constraints.
CONSTRAINT GENERATION: FROM RSSOD REQUIREMENTS TO SMER CONSTRAINTS
In this section, we show how to generate SMER constraints from a set of RSSoD requirements. In Section 5.2, we have shown how to compute a set of RSSoD requirements that capture the security requirements inherent in an SSoD configuration E, PA, RH . Together these sections show how one can generate SMER constraints to enforce an SSoD configuration.
As there are often multiple sets of constraints that can enforce the same set of SSoD policies, we would like to generate constraint sets that are not "more restrictive than necessary." For this purpose, we formally define the notion of "precise enforcement" and "minimal enforcement." In Section 6.1, we show that in two cases one can generate SMER constraints that precisely enforce RSSoD requirements and that precise enforcement is impossible in other cases. In Section 6.2, we show that while 2-2 SMER constraints are sufficient to enforce any RSSoD requirements, having k-k SMER constraints for larger k enables more precise enforcement. In Section 6.3, we show how to generate all singleton constraint sets that minimally enforce an RSSoD requirement.
Precise Enforcement of RSSoD Requirements
One way to enforce a set of RSSoD requirements is to declare every pair of roles to be mutually exclusive. However, this is ofttimes too restrictive. Ideally, we want to generate constraints that precisely enforce the RSSoD requirements.
Definition 19. Let D be a set of RSSoD requirements and C be a set of SMER constraints. We say that C enforces D if, and only if, the following holds:
We say that C is necessary to enforce D if, and only if, the following holds:
where live D (γ ) means that for every role r appearing in D, there exists a user who is a member of r.
We say C precisely enforces D if, and only if, C both enforces D and is necessary to enforce D. The RSSoD requirement means that at least three users are required to cover the three roles {r 1 , r 2 , r 3 }. To enforce this, one would naturally require that no single user is a member of two or more roles in {r 1 , r 2 , r 3 }, which is the constraint in C. Intuitively, C is necessary to enforce E. However, ∀γ [safe D (γ ) ⇒ satisfies C (γ )] is not true, as there exist RBAC states that violate C and are safe with respect to D. Consider RH = ∅ and UA = {(u 1 , r 1 ), (u 1 , r 2 )}. The constraint in C is violated because u 1 is a member of both r 1 and r 2 . Yet (UA,RH) is safe with respect to D, as no user is a member of r 3 , and, thus, no two users cover {r 1 , r 2 , r 3 }. However, if we extend the RBAC state to make some user a member of r 3 , then the resulting state is not safe with respect to D. The extra condition live D (UA, RH) addresses this issue.
We now give two cases where precise enforcement is possible.
LEMMA 5. Given a k-k RSSoD requirement d = rssod {r 1 , . . . , r k }, k , the singleton constraint set {c = smer {r 1 , . . . , r k }, 2 } precisely enforces {d }.
PROOF. The requirement d means that k users are required to cover all k roles. The constraint c means that no user is allowed to be a member of two roles in the set. We first show that {c} enforces {d }. If no user is a member of two roles from the set of k roles, then k users are needed to cover the k roles. To show that c is necessary, consider the following. Given an RBAC state γ that violates c, we show that live {d } (γ ) and safe {d } (γ ) cannot both be true. As γ violates c, there exists a user who has memberships in two roles from the set of k roles. If live {d } (γ ) is true, then for every role other than the two roles there exists a user who is a member of it. Thus, k − 1 users cover the k roles and safe {d } (γ ) is false.
LEMMA 13. Given a 2-n RSSoD requirement d = rssod {r 1 , . . . , r n }, 2 , the singleton constraint set { c = smer {r 1 , . . . , r n }, n } precisely enforces { d }.
PROOF. The requirement d means that two users are required to cover all n roles. The constraint c means that no user is allowed to be a member of all the roles in the set. We first show that { c} enforces { d }. If no user is allowed to be authorized for all n roles from the set, then at least two users are required to cover all the n roles. To show that { c} is necessary, consider the following. Given an RBAC state γ that violates c, there is a user that is a member of all roles from the set of n roles. Thus safe {d } (γ ) is false.
In fact, as we prove in Lemma 23 (in Section 6.3, after results needed for the proof have been developed), for every k and n such that 2 < k < n, there exists no set of SMER constraints that precisely enforces a k-n RSSoD requirement. That is, the two special cases in Lemmas 5 and 13 are the only cases where precise enforcement can be achieved. As precise enforcement is not achievable in many cases, we give a method to generate "good" sets of SMER constraints that are as precise as possible.
Expressive Power of Different t-m SMER Constraints
Before discussing the generation of "good" sets of SMER constraints, we look at the expressive power of t-m SMER constraints using different values of t and m. We would like to answer questions such as: Does an RBAC system that supports 3-3 SMER constraints have more expressive power than an RBAC system that supports only 2-2 SMER constraints? Answers to such questions will help developers of RBAC systems decide which kinds of constraints to support.
From Lemma 4 we know that t-m SMER constraints, where m > t, can be equivalently represented using t-t SMER constraints; thus noncanonical constraints do not add additional expressive power in terms of enforcing SSoD policies. From the proof of Lemma 7, we know that 2-2 SMER constraints are sufficient for enforcing (albeit not always precisely) any enforceable SSoD configuration. We now show that 2-2 SMER constraints (or 2-n SMER constraints, which can be equivalently expressed using 2-2 SMER constraints) are required in the sense that they cannot be replaced with other k-n SMER (where k ≥ 3) constraints.
LEMMA 14. There exist RSSoD requirements that cannot be enforced without using 2-n SMER constraints.
PROOF. A t-t
RSSoD requirement rssod {r 1 , . . . , r t }, t requires that no t − 1 users cover all t roles. It can be enforced only by using 2-n SMER constraints, as these are the only type of constraints that prevent two roles from being assigned to a single user.
Although in all cases, 2-2 SMER constraints are sufficient to enforce enforceable SSoD configurations, using only such constraints is not always desirable as other kinds of constraints may provide more precise enforcement. The following lemma expresses this.
LEMMA 15. For any n > 2, there exists an RSSoD requirement that can be precisely enforced using a canonical constraint of cardinality n, but cannot be precisely enforced using any set of t-m SMER constraints with t < n.
PROOF. Consider the 2-n RSSoD requirement d = rssod {r 1 , . . . , r n }, 2 (at least two users are required to cover the n roles). The n-n SMER constraint c = smer {r 1 , . . . , r n }, n (no single user is allowed to be authorized for all n roles) precisely enforces the configuration, as was shown in Lemma 13.
We now show that no set of t-m SMER constraints with t < n precisely enforces { d }. Assume, for the sake of contradiction, that there exists such a set. Then there exists a set C of canonical constraints of cardinalities, less than n, that also precisely enforces { d }. At least one constraint, c, in C must be such that all roles in the constraint are in {r 1 , . . . , r n }; otherwise, one could assign one user to have all roles in {r 1 , . . . , r n } without violating any constraint in C. Because c is a canonical constraint of cardinality t < n, the set S of roles in c is a strict subset of {r 1 , . . . , r n }. This constraint c is not necessary for implementing the SSoD configuration, as an RBAC state in which a user is assigned to be a member of all roles in S is safe with respect to the requirement d , as long as the user is not a member of some role in {r 1 , . . . , r n } − S.
This lemma suggests that if one wants to enforce an arbitrary RSSoD requirement as precisely as possible, then one needs to support n-n SMER constraints for arbitrary n.
"Good" Sets of SMER Constraints: Definition
While two sets of constraints may both enforce the same RSSoD requirements, they have different degrees of restrictiveness.
Definition 20. Let C 1 and C 2 be two sets of SMER constraints. We say that C 1 is at least as restrictive as C 2 (denoted by C 1 C 2 ) if, and only if, the following holds:
The relation among all sets of SMER constraints is a partial order. When C 1 C 2 , but not C 2 C 1 , we say that C 1 is more restrictive than C 2 (denoted by C 1 C 2 ). By definition, C 1 and C 2 are equivalent (Definition 11) if, and only if, C 1 C 2 and C 2 C 1 .
When neither C 1 C 2 nor C 2 C 1 , we say C 1 and C 2 are incomparable.
When both C and C enforce a set D of RSSoD requirements, there are four cases:
1. C C , in which case, C is preferable to C for enforcing D as it is less restrictive (and thus more precise); 2. C C, in which case, C is preferable to C ; 3. C and C are equivalent, in which case, either C or C can be used; 4. C and C are incomparable, in which case, the decision to choose C over C (or C over C) depends on considerations other than SSoD policies.
Definition 21. Given a set D of RSSoD requirements, we say that a set C of SMER constraints is minimal for enforcing D if, and only if, C enforces D and there does not exist a different set C of SMER constraints such that C also enforces D and C C (C is more restrictive than C ).
Our approach to dealing with the generation problem is to exhaustively generate all singleton sets of SMER constraints that are minimal for enforcing D (for any such set, no other set is strictly more preferable to it, based on precision of enforcement) and leave the choice to the system administrator. PROOF. Given C that precisely enforces D and C that also enforces D, we need to show that: (a) ∀γ (satisfies C (γ ) ⇒ satisfies C (γ )). 
Note that (a) and (b) differ in that (b) has live D (γ ) in the antecedent inside the range of the quantifier ∀γ . We now show that (b) implies (a). Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that (b) is true, but (a) is not. There then exists a state γ , such that satisfies C (γ ) is true, but satisfies C (γ ) is not. If such a state γ exists, then there exists a state γ 1 such that the role hierarchy relation in γ 1 is empty and satisfies C (γ 1 ) is true, but satisfies C (γ 1 ) is false. The state γ 1 can be constructed by computing all role memberships in γ and assigning these role memberships using UA. We then construct a state γ 2 by adding to γ 1 the following user-to-role assignments: for each role r mentioned in D, assign a new user (one who is not a member of any role in γ 1 ) to be a member of r. (Different users are used for different roles, so each new user is a member of exactly one role.) We denote the resultant state γ 2 . Clearly, live D (γ 2 ) is true. Furthermore, by construction of γ 2 , satisfies C (γ ) ⇔ satisfies C (γ 2 ), and satisfies C (γ ) ⇔ satisfies C (γ 2 ). Therefore, satisfies C (γ 2 ) is true but satisfies C (γ 2 ) is not. This is in contradiction to (b) being true. PROOF. Given any C that also enforces D, it follows from Lemma 16 that C C, thus, it cannot be C C (which implies that ¬(C C)). This shows that C is minimal.
Given any C 1 that is also minimal for enforcing D, it follows from Lemma 16 that C 1 C. Then either C 1 C, or C 1 and C is equivalent. As we have just shown that C 1 C is impossible, C 1 and C must be equivalent. PROOF. By Contradiction. If there exists a set C that precisely enforces D, then from Lemma 17, C is equivalent to C 1 and to C 2 . This contradicts the fact that C 1 and C 2 are incomparable.
Generating Minimal Sets of SMER Constraints
Below we define the function SMER-Gen, which has the property that SMER-Gen(rssod R, k ) gives all singleton sets of SMER constraints that are minimal for enforcing the RSSoD requirement rssod R, k .
Definition 22. The function SMER-Gen is defined as follows:
To see that the above definition is well defined for the case of k ≥ 3, we observe that j < |R | ≤ n with the following reasoning. Because k ≥ 3 and j ≥ 2, we have
To understand the definition of SMER-Gen, consider the following examples.
The requirement rssod R, 2 means that two users are required to cover all roles in R and the constraint {smer R, |R| } means that no user can be a member of all roles in R. r SMER-Gen(rssod R, |R| ) = { { smer R, 2 } }.
The requirement rssod R, |R| means that |R| users are required to cover all roles in R and the constraint smer R, 2 means that a user can be a member of, at most, one role in R. r SMER-Gen(rssod {r 1 , r 2 , r 3 , r 4 }, 3 ) = { { smer {r 1 , r 2 , r 3 }, 2 }, { smer {r 1 , r 2 , r 4 }, 2 }, { smer {r 1 , r 3 , r 4 }, 2 }, { smer {r 2 , r 3 , r 4 }, 2 } }. The requirement rssod {r 1 , r 2 , r 3 , r 4 }, 3 means that three users are required to cover all four roles. There are four singleton constraint sets in SMER-Gen rssod {r 1 , r 2 , r 3 , r 4 }, 3 . The first one contains the constraint smer {r 1 , r 2 , r 3 }, 2 , which means that no user is allowed to be a member of two or more roles in {r 1 , r 2 , r 3 } and is sufficient to ensure that three users are required to cover all three roles. r SMER-Gen(rssod {r 1 , r 2 , r 3 , r 4 , r 5 }, 3 ) = { { smer {r 1 , r 2 , r 3 }, 2 }, { smer {r 1 , r 2 , r 4 }, 2 }, . . . , { smer {r 3 , r 4 , r 5 }, 2 }, { smer {r 1 , r 2 , r 3 , r 4 , r 5 }, 3 } }. The requirement rssod {r 1 , r 2 , r 3 , r 4 , r 5 }, 3 means that three users are required to cover all five roles. SMER-Gen(rssod {r 1 , r 2 , r 3 , r 4 , r 5 }, 3 ) contains 11 singleton constraint sets. Ten of them each contains one 2-3 SMER constraint. Each of the ten corresponds to one size-3 subset of {r 1 , r 2 , r 3 , r 4 , r 5 }. The last one contains the constraint smer {r 1 , r 2 , r 3 , r 4 , r 5 }, 3 , which mandates that each user is a member of, at most, two roles in the set of five roles, and is sufficient to ensure that three users are needed to cover all five roles.
• N. Li et al. Example 5. SMER-Gen(rssod {Engineering, Warehouse, Accounting, Finance}, 3 ) contains the following four singleton sets of SMER constraints: C 4 = { smer {Warehouse, Accounting, Finance}, 2 } C 5 = { smer {Engineering, Accounting, Finance}, 2 } C 6 = { smer {Engineering, Warehouse, Finance}, 2 } C 7 = { smer {Engineering, Warehouse, Accounting}, 2 } Any SMER constraint from above is sufficient to satisfy the RSSoD requirement. Each constraint is minimal and the constraints are incomparable with each other. Each leaves a different role unconstrained. For example, if one picks C 5 as the constraint to use, then the role Warehouse is not constrained.
The correctness of the definition of SMER-Gen in Definition 22 is justified by the following three lemmas.
PROOF. It is straightforward to see that this holds when d is a 2-n RSSoD requirement. We now show that this holds when
To cover all roles in R, one has to cover all roles in R c . As a user is allowed to be a member of, at most, j − 1 roles in R c , any set of k − 1 users can cover, at most, (k−1)( j −1) roles in R c . Therefore, no set of k − 1 users can cover all roles in R c without violating the constraint c. Thus { c} enforces { d }.
LEMMA 20. Given an RSSoD requirement d , each constraint set in SMER-
By Lemma 4 we know that c can be equivalently expressed as a set C of j -j SMER constraints. Assume, for the sake of contradiction, that { c} is not minimal. Then there exists a set C of SMER constraints that also enforces { d } and C is less restrictive than C, i.e., (C C ) ∧ ¬(C C). Because ¬(C C), there exists a state γ , such that satisfies C (γ ) is true, but satisfies C (γ ) is not. This means that at least one j -j SMER constraint c v ∈ C is violated by γ . Let R v be the set of j roles in c v ; there exists a user in γ who is a member of the j roles in R v . As γ satisfies C , having one user being a member of all roles in R v does not violate C .
We now construct another state γ , such that satisfies C (γ ) is true, but safe {d } (γ ) is not. This would contradict the assertion that C enforces { d }.
In order to construct γ , we first construct another state γ 1 as follows:
r Use k − 2 users to cover the roles in R c \ R v , with each user being a member of, at most, j − 1 roles in R c \ R v . This is possible because
r Assign one of the k − 2 users to be a member of all roles in R d \ R c . Observe
Note that γ 1 satisfies c = smer R c , j . This is because c does not place any restriction on role memberships about roles in R d \ R c and each user in γ 1 has, at most, j − 1 roles in R c . Because C is equivalent to {c}, satisfies C (γ 1 ) is true. Because C C , satisfies C (γ 1 ) is also true. We now construct γ by adding to γ 1 a new user and assigning the user to be a member of all roles in R v . The state γ has k − 1 users; together they have memberships in all roles in R d . Thus safe {d } (γ ) is false. The state γ also satisfies C , as the role memberships of the k − 2 users in γ 1 do not violate C and neither does the new user who is a member of all roles in R v .
LEMMA 21. Given an RSSoD requirement d , every singleton SMER constraint set that is minimal for enforcing
we do a case-by-case analysis for any singleton SMER constraint set {c = smer R c , j }. In each case, we show that either { c} does not enforce
+ 2. By assigning to each of k − 1 users j − 1 roles, we are able to cover (k − 1)( j − 1) roles without violating the constraint c. Observe that for every pair of positive integers x, y, 
Let m = (k −1)( j −1)+1. As SMER-Gen(d ) contains a constraint set that has a j -m SMER constraint for each size-m subset of R d , there exist a constraint set {c = smer R , j } in SMER-Gen(d ) with a set of roles R such that R ⊂ R c . This implies { c } { c}, therefore, { c } is not minimal.
We have |R c | ≤ (k − 1)( j − 1). By assigning to k − 1 users, at most, j − 1 roles each, we are able to cover all m roles in R c without violating c. By further assigning one user to be a member of all roles in R d \ R c , the state is not safe with respect to d while satisfying c. Thus { c} does not enforce { d }.
The five cases above cover all possible situations.
The three lemmas above together show that SMER-Gen gives all singleton sets of SMER constraints that are minimal for enforcing a given RSSoD requirement.
We now prove that given a k-n RSSoD requirement where 2 < k < n, there exists no set of SMER constraints that precisely enforces it. Before doing that, we first show how to compare two singleton sets of SMER constraints. PROOF. For the "if " direction, we show that if |R 2 | − |R 1 | ≤ k 2 − k 1 , then any RBAC state that violates c 2 violates also c 1 . Let δ = |R 2 | − |R 1 |. If a state violates c 2 , then one user in the state is a member of at least k 2 roles in R 2 , since, at most, δ roles in R 2 are not in R 1 , the user is a member of at least k 2 − δ roles in R 1 . As δ ≤ k 2 − k 1 , we have k 2 − δ ≥ k 2 − (k 2 − k 1 ) = k 1 ; therefore, the state violates also c 1 .
For the "only if " direction, we show that if |R 2 | − |R 1 | > k 2 − k 1 , then { c 1 } { c 2 }. Assume that δ = |R 2 | − |R 1 | > k 2 − k 1 , we construct the following state, which satisfies { c 1 }, but violates { c 2 }. In the state, there are |R 2 | − k 2 + 1 users. One user, denoted by u 1 , is a member of all roles in R 2 \ R 1 and k 2 − δ other roles in R 2 , all remaining users are member of one remaining role in R 2 . As u 1 is a member of k 2 roles in R 2 , the state violates {c 2 }. The user u 1 is a member of, at most, k 2 − δ roles in R 1 . Because δ > k 2 − k 1 , we have k 2 − δ < k 1 ; thus the user u 1 is safe with respect to { c 1 }. All other users are members of only one role and are thus safe with respect to { c 1 }. Therefore, the state satisfies { c 1 }.
We are now able to prove the following Lemma.
LEMMA 23. Given a k-n RSSoD requirement, where 2 < k < n, there exists no set of SMER constraints that precisely enforce it.
PROOF. It suffices to show that, given d = rssod R d , k where 2 < k < |R d | = n, SMER-Gen(d ) contains at least two singleton sets of SMER constraints that are incomparable, as then, we know that each such constraint is minimal (Lemma 20) and, therefore, there exists no set of SMER constraints that precisely enforces the RSSoD requirement (Lemma 18).
When 2 < k < n, we observe that
where the right-hand side is the result of setting j = 2 in the definition of SMER-Gen. Because k < n, there are at least two size-k subset of R d . Therefore, SMER-Gen (d) contains at least two different singleton constraint sets {smer R 1 , 2 } and {smer R 2 , 2 } such that R 1 and R 2 are two different size-k subset of R d . By Lemma 22, neither {smer R 1 , 2 } {smer R 2 , 2 } nor {smer R 2 , 2 } {smer R 1 , 2 }; thus these two constraint sets are incomparable.
SMER-Gen(d ) does not contain all sets of SMER constraints that are minimal to enforce { d }. Constraint sets of cardinality greater than 1 may exist that are minimal for enforcing the requirement. SMER-Gen(d ) contains all singleton sets of SMER constraints that are minimal for enforcing { d }.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We have posed and answered several fundamental questions related to the use of SMER constraints to enforce SSoD policies, while making a clear distinction between objectives and mechanisms. We have shown that directly enforcing SSoD policies is intractable (coNP-complete), while enforcing SMER constraints is efficient; however, verifying whether a given set of SMER constraints enforces an SSoD policy is also intractable (coNP-complete), even for a basic subcase of the problem. We have compared three approaches for enforcing SSoD policies: (1) directly enforcing SSoD policies, (2) using SMER constraints and verifying that the SMER constraints enforce the SSoD policies, and, (3) generating SMER constraints from the SSoD policies and verifying that the RBAC state satisfies the SMER constraints.
Given the intractability results related to approaches (1) and (2), we have studied the problem of generating SMER constraints that enforce SSoD policies. The generation process involves first translating SSoD policies into RSSoD requirements. We have characterized the kinds of policies for which precise enforcement is achievable and shown what constraints precisely enforce such policies. We have also shown how to generate all singleton SMER constraint sets that minimally enforce an RSSoD requirement.
An interesting problem that remains is whether the generation algorithm can be improved to consider preexisting SMER constraints and to consider a set of SSoD policies as a whole rather than individually. Other kinds of constraints also have been proposed for RBAC, e.g., cardinality constraints and constraints on permission assignment [Sandhu et al. 1996] . It would be interesting to examine the use of SMER constraints together with these constraints to enforce SSoD policies.
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Portions of this work were supported by NSF CAREER grant (0448204) and sponsors of CERIAS. We thank the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments that have resulted in significant improvements of the paper. that it evaluates to 1. The SAT problem is the problem of determining whether an expression in CNF is satisfiable. The complement of the satisfiability problem is the validity problem: whether for any truth assignment, the expression evaluates to 1.
The 3-SAT problem is SAT with each clause having exactly three literals. It is well-known that SAT and MONOTONE-SAT are NP-complete, and their complements are coNP-complete.
A1. Monotone 3-2-SAT is NP-complete
MONOTONE-3-SAT is 3-SAT with each clause containing either only positive or only negative literals; it is known to be NP-complete [Garey and Johnson 1979] . We use MONOTONE-3-2-SAT to denote SAT, with each clause containing either three positive literals or two negative literals.
THEOREM 24. MONOTONE-3-2-SAT is NP-complete.
PROOF. MONOTONE-3-2-SAT is clearly in NP. We show that it is NP-hard by reducing 3-SAT to MONOTONE-3-2-SAT.
Let ( 1 ∨ 2 ∨ 3 ) be a clause. Case (1): all three literals are positive. No change needs to be made. Case (2): one is negative. Wlog, assume that 3 is negative. This clause can be equivalently represented using a positive clause ( 1 ∨ 2 ∨ w) and a negative clause (¬w ∨ 3 ), where w is a newly introduced propositional variable. This technique turns one literal from negative to positive by introducing a new propositional variable and a new length-2 negative clause. Case (3): two are negative. Apply the above technique twice. Case (4): three are negative. Apply the above technique three times.
